Intellectual
dishonesty and the culpability of all
James
Nixey
Aside
from the avoidable loss of innocent life, one of the most
depressing thing about the past few days is the lack of intellectual
honesty on display.
At
the time of writing, as they say, the ceasefire between Russia
and Georgia is precarious at best and not worth the paper
it is written on at worst. We might almost be back to the
stage of frozen conflict' except, as we turn to reassess what
has happened, we find the pieces on the chessboard have been
rearranged. The status quo ante has gone forever. What will
replace it?
But
first, let us backtrack and be clear: there is culpability
on both sides. Georgia's large-scale use of force and taking
of human life on 7-8 August was disastrous and disproportionate.
Moreover, it is vital to understand the basic fact, though
South Ossetia is legally Georgian territory (a point Russia
has never contested), the majority of South Ossetians do not
wish to be a part of Georgia. Now, after the devastation of
Tskhinvali, that majority is even greater. So, a strategic
miscalculation as well, but moral culpability first and foremost.
But
Georgia's actions were far from unprovoked. There was prior
force directed against Georgian forces and settlements by
South Ossetian separatists both long before and on 7 August
itself. The Russians, who have backed them militarily and
economically, cannot avoid responsibility for this and the
role of Russian peacekeepers' on 7 August is still murky.
Russia's
claim of a humanitarian operation rings absurdly hollow. By
extending military action into "Georgia proper,"
particularly the devastation wrecked on Gori, Russia knows
full well it cannot avoid the charge of being an aggressive
bully with little regard for the value of human life.
But
it doesn't care. Russia seeks respect (in the sense of acknowledgement
of great power status), not approval. But stopping when it
did (if it has), Russia, disgraceful as it may seem, may nonetheless
receive plaudits from some European countries whose principles
are locked away when dealing with Russia. Morally bankrupt,
Russia has played this game beautifully. Being told by U.K.
Foreign Secretary David Miliband that Russia is returning
to its Soviet past, is hardly going to hurt a man [like Putin]
who has said that the collapse of the USSR was the greatest
geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century. Indeed, Mr.
Putin may take it as a compliment.
Meanwhile,
Dmitry Medvedev (who, to many westerners now looks even more
like the puppet many have always thought him to be) is also
fast losing the liberal lawyer' image which many in the West
were desperate to pin on him. On strings or not, he is learning
fast... and probably the wrong lessons. But he is also learning
he is not in charge if he ever doubted it.
So,
ceasefire or continued fighting (reports are contradictory),
with the Georgians humiliated and forcibly removed from South
Ossetia and Abkhazia and themselves installed, Russia wins
hands down. Except, perhaps, for one thing. Russia may have
won the battle yet end up losing the war. Even if the West
does nothing concrete in the short term (ejecting Russia from
G8 is not yet seriously being considered), then more people
than ever will at least come to the conclusion that Russia
is a danger and a threat to the region and to Europe. This,
surely, cannot be in Russia's long-term interests. But Russia
often acts against its own interests and a rational actor'
model cannot be applied when guessing its next step, nor its
interpretation of anyone else's.
The
West must bear some blame for this too. The fudge at the Bucharest
NATO summit in April to give Georgia (and Ukraine) the guarantee
of eventual membership, but not to grant it the Membership
Action Plan (MAP) looked clever at the time, trying to please
everyone, but it now appears to have backfired. Georgia has
not been given clear enough signals as to what it must do
to join and no less important, what it must not do. Had it
received them, this may have prevented Mr. Saakashvili from
taking the reckless action he did on 8 August. Now the hard
and admirable work that Georgia has put into meeting the criteria
for NATO entry seems to be in vain. Russia will not (because
it cannot) be directly punished for these events, at least
in the short term. Not so Georgia: its NATO ambitions now
look more distant than ever, in spite of good progress on
corruption and defence reform. But more distant prospects
may also be firmer prospects, especially if the map of Georgia
has changed.
If
a more stable Georgia one day emerges from this crisis, it
will be more attractive to NATO.
Aside
from the avoidable loss of innocent life, one of the most
depressing thing about the past few days is the lack of intellectual
honesty on display. Rather than examine motive and facts on
the ground, both Russians and Georgians have chosen to extract
what they wish from the overall picture and used it to fit
their pre-existing nationalist ideologies. Russia apologists
and Russophobes everywhere have all weighed in over the last
few days, conveniently ignoring atrocities committed by the
other side'. Hypocrisy is prevalent on both sides too and
worse still, the outrageous use of the word genocide' not
even remotely applicable to this dirty little war. But whatever
happens now in the Caucasus, relations between Russia and
the West (and Russia's westward-inclined neighbours) must
surely, from this moment on, be re-evaluated by all.
(James
Nixey is a Russian Foreign Policy and South Caucasus expert
and Manager of the Russia Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute
of International Affairs (Chatham-House), London.)
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